Explaining Reform Deadlocks by Heinemann, Friedrich
Discussion Paper No. 04-39
Explaining Reform Deadlocks
Friedrich Heinemann
Discussion Paper No. 04-39
Explaining Reform Deadlocks
Friedrich Heinemann
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von 
neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung 
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other 
economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0439.pdf
 Non-Technical Summary 
While the reasons for poor growth rates and high unemployment tend to be well 
known in today’s unsuccessful economies these problems are often only slowly 
addressed (if at all). These reform deadlocks cannot be explained easily since they 
cause substantial costs for large groups in the economy. This paper is a first and 
unique attempt to identify the factors that tend to favour or block beneficial 
economic reforms on a large empirical basis: the reform experience of 123 countries 
from different income classes since 1970. 
In the preparatory theoretical part, two fundamentally different classes of 
explanations are discussed: those that stick to the rationality assumption and those 
that allow for limited rationality. Rational explanations are related to uncertainty, 
distributive consequences associated with reforms and the theory of interest groups. 
It is argued that this class of rational stories can explain important but not all 
dimensions of reform resistance. In addition, phenomena of rational ignorance and 
limited rationality must be considered for a full understanding. It is shown that 
behavioural anomalies as they have been established in the analysis of financial 
market behaviour (“behavioural finance”) should have even wider applications in 
the economic policy context.  
The empirical approach makes use of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of 
the World (EFW) index. Due to its availability for a large country sample (123 
countries) and the fact that its data range back to 1970, the EFW indicator offers a 
good starting point for a quantification of economic reform processes. The 
availability of sub-indices (e.g. with regard to the “size of government” or 
“regulation” or “sound money”) is of particular interest in the context of economic 
reform obstacles. It allows to test for the impact of potential obstacles on different 
fields of economic reforms. A further advantage is the fact that a wide literature has 
established at least a correlation if not a causal relationship between economic 
freedom as measured by the indicator and economic growth. Measuring reform 
processes on the basis of the EFW indicator therefore implies the measurement of 
structural changes conducive for growth. 
In the analysis, a reform event is defined as a significant change in the EFW index 
within a five year interval. In a first descriptive step, an extensive comparison shows 
which significant differences exist between reform and no-reform countries prior to 
the reform period. In the next and more refined analytical step, a probit model is 
estimated. The probability of reforms is explained by variables that serve as proxies 
for the objective need of reforms, political-economic obstacles and phenomena of 
limited rationality and/or rational ignorance. 
A number of interesting insights emerge from this empirical analysis: The worse a 
country’s initial institutional setting the more likely are reforms. Equally, a poor 
growth performance has a positive impact on a country’s ability to overcome reform 
resistance. Among political-economic proxies the age structure has a certain 
 explanatory power at least in the regressions based on the EFW total indicator. Here, 
reform probabilities decrease with the age of a population. This is a worrying result 
given the demographic future of industrial countries and the resulting needs for 
reforming the social systems. Data availability does not allow to test for the 
relevance of limited information and limited rationality in an extensive way. School 
enrolment as the related proxy is significant only in the government reform 
regression. This means a higher level of education makes it easier to reform the 
government sector. Apart from these results, other interesting insights emerge as a 
by-product: The significant period dummies are evidence for changing fashions in 
the focus of reforms.  
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Abstract  
Countries are often slow to adjust their economic structures to new necessities 
although this reform reluctance is costly in terms of growth and employment. This 
paper analyses the relevant factors that block or foster economic reforms. 
Theoretical considerations show that there are at least three classes of potentially 
relevant factors: the objective need for reforms, political-economic issues and 
factors associated with limited rationality or rational ignorance. In the empirical 
analysis, a reform event is quantified as a significant change of the Economic 
Freedom of the World indicator within a five-year-period. This allows to run probit 
estimations for a large country panel starting in the 1970s where the probability of 
reform is explained by a number of proxies covering all three classes of potential 
factors. The results suggest that the initial extent of economic freedom and growth 
performance are empirically relevant factors. Furthermore, countries with an ageing 
population appear to behave less reform friendly.  
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1 Introduction 
Why are countries frequently so slow to adjust their economic structures to new 
necessities although this reform reluctance leads to substantial growth and 
employment losses? In these days it is of crucial importance to find a convincing 
answer to this question.  
Particularly, in big EU countries like Germany, France and Italy there appear to be 
huge lags between identification of economic problems and the implementation of 
political remedies. Examples concern highly regulated labour markets, an excessive 
tax burden and the exploding costs of the social security systems not adjusted to the 
needs of an ageing population. That these factors are at the root of growth problems 
in many countries is largely uncontroversial in spite of all debates in detail. Given 
this principal consensus it is hard to explain why a number of countries are so 
hesitant to change structures even if the costs of the reform deadlock have become 
highly visible in the growth and labour market statistics. 
This phenomenon is not only a challenge for economic policy but also for economic 
theory: It is no easy task to reconcile this self-destructive behaviour of whole 
societies with the central economic assumption of rationality. Of course, political-
economic theory possesses concepts and models to explain under certain 
assumptions “stupid” social decision making in spite of individual rationality. 
Explanations as shortly surveyed below range from Down’s notion of “rational 
ignorance” to Alesina’s and Dranzen’s “war of attrition”. However, this class of 
elegant explanations loses its convincing power, the more visible, relevant and 
certain the costs of the reform deadlock become for an overwhelming majority of the 
population.  
In some instances, the refusal to acknowledge basic economic realities appears so 
widely spread among populations that it is not easy to stick faithfully to the 
assumption that voters are rational and optimising individuals. The debate on the 
pension age is one of the examples: With the dramatic increase in life expectancy, 
low birth rates and the resulting population ageing there is no doubt that the lifting 
of the pension age is one of the unavoidable measures to limit the exploding 
dependency ratios in the coming decades. Nevertheless overwhelming majorities of 
all age classes in the population are opposed to this measure according to recent 
opinion polls, e.g., in Germany.  
In financial economics behavioural economists have made use of non-rational 
psychological patterns in human behaviour to explain financial market phenomena. 
It is amazing that the same instruments have rarely been applied to the analysis of 
economic policy. Of course, it is a challenge for the economic profession to debate 
the rationality assumption. However, given the fact that irrationalities are observable 
in financial market decision making there is no reason to exclude the possibility of 
irrational behaviour a priori as an explanation for economic policy failures. 
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Given these profound intellectual and political problems, our understanding for the 
true reasons behind today’s reform deadlocks is absolutely dissatisfactory. These 
research deficiencies are particularly marked on the empirical field as Rodrik (1996, 
25) complains: “We now need theoretically informed case studies - or more formal 
tests - that attempt to discriminate among these alternative stories”. This study 
follows this recommendation not in regard to case study techniques but focuses on 
more formal testing on the basis of a large country panel. With the exception of 
Pitilik and Wirth (2003) to our knowledge there are no comparable attempts in the 
literature. Close to our approach, these authors endogenise economic reforms but 
focus on the hypothesis that crisis is a precondition for reforms without showing 
interest into a wide spectre of rational and irrational types of reform obstacles.  
This paper’s empirical approach is the following: Based on a panel of 123 countries 
it is analysed which factors can explain that some countries experience significant 
reform eras and others do not. The occurrence of reforms is measured on the basis of 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index. Both the aggregate 
index and the sub-components are analysed so that differentiated insights for 
different fields of economic policy (size of government, property rights, monetary 
regime, external freedom and regulation) can be derived. Among the potentially 
explaining factors a distinction is made between three classes of variables: first, 
proxies for the objective necessity of reform, second, proxies for political-economic 
reform obstacles and third, proxies that hint to the relevance limited information or 
limited rationality. 
The structure is as follows: In the next section a brief survey is given on the classes 
of reform obstacles that are discussed in the literature. Section three describes the 
variables and presents a first descriptive view on the data. In section four, the 
econometric analysis is presented. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
2 Reform obstacles 
Explanations why societies do not accept economic reforms that are beneficial for a 
large majority of citizens can be divided into those that stick to the rationality 
assumption and those that do not. 
 
Explanations based on rational reform resistance 
Examples for rational explanations are the following (for a survey see Rodrik, 
1996): Reforms might be beneficial to the population as a whole in the sense of 
higher growth rates and welfare, nevertheless distributive consequences are 
unavoidable. There are always groups that suffer from adjusting economic 
structures. The standard interest group explanation related to these distributive 
aspects is that minorities that suffer from reforms are well organised and powerful 
enough to block any change hurting them. The distributive consequences might 
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interact with discount rates differing between groups in society. If certain reform 
projects have a J-curve effect – short-run losses followed by long-term gains – 
groups with a short time horizon and high discount rates are likely to oppose these 
projects.  These inter-temporal aspects are likely to be of particular relevance in 
ageing societies where the growing higher age segments of the population apply a 
heavy discounting. 
Uncertainty about a reform’s outcome - possibly coupled with risk-aversion - can be 
a further obstacle to reforms: Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that even with 
risk-neutral voters uncertainty about the winners’ identity can lead to the democratic 
rejection of reforms that are beneficial for a majority. Models that focus on 
incomplete information and coordination problems show that reforms might be 
blocked even though this implies that the politically powerful groups hurts 
themselves. Alesina’s and Drazen’s “war of attrition” (1991) is the classic example 
on this field where two groups are uncertain about the opponent’s cost of 
stabilisation and both have an incentive to delay reforms. These examples for 
rational reform resistance can be relevant under democratic regimes or under 
dictatorship alike.  
Rational ignorance (Downs, 1957) is a further variant of rational explanations for 
detrimental institutional stickiness. According to the Downsian notion voters’ 
individual information optimisation results in socially inefficient information 
activities. The consequence is that voters are badly informed about the consequences 
of reform options and about the costs of the status quo. 
While these rational explanations are elegant and without doubt hint towards 
important real dimensions of the reform problem they do not appear to be fully 
satisfactory. So it is not clear at all why reforms should necessarily increase 
uncertainty about the economic future of individuals or certain interest groups. This 
is particularly questionable if the status quo is not sustainable. With an ageing 
population, sticking to the status quo, e.g., in the field of pay-as-you-go pension 
systems creates significant uncertainty about future pension payments. In this field, 
reforms that create a more sustainable system are likely to be conducive for the 
pension promise’s credibility. Therefore, reforms can be a way to limit uncertainty.  
Neither are those explanations always convincing which are based on the 
distributive consequences of reforms. Nowadays countries in acute reform deadlocks 
suffer from significant growth and welfare losses which hurt both a large majority of 
the population and many politically powerful interest groups. Here it is hard to see 
which groups are reform losers and at the same time powerful enough to block 
reforms against all those who would benefit. Interest group related explanations also 
face the difficulty to explain why opposing minorities which are politically 
influential cannot be compensated by reform winners. The incentive for paying these 
compensations is the larger on the side of the winners the higher the costs of the 
status quo. 
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Finally it is doubtful whether rational ignorance can really establish a systematic 
bias against reforms. A low level of information means that people have wrong 
expectations about the consequences of reforms but there is no obvious argument 
why this should necessarily imply any bias against reforms. Without further 
arguments it is equally likely that poor information is associated with an overly 
euphoric assessment of reforms (Wittman, 1995). In any case the rational ignorance 
arguments is weakened the more visible the cost of institutional stickiness become. 
 
Explanations based on limited rationality 
Given the above mentioned difficulties of rational explanations a fundamentally 
different class of approaches gives up the assumption of full rationality. Proponents 
(Caplan, 2001) state their analytical starting point in the following way: “[Voters] 
oppose better policies not from complicated strategic calculations, but because they 
don’t understand what works. ... . What dominates political debate and public 
opinion is not subtle strategizing, but elementary economic misconception.” 
Behavioural patterns that constitute deviations from rationally optimising behaviour 
have frequently been applied in financial market economics (see for example Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2002). It is amazing that the success of the “behavioural 
finance” field is not yet paralleled by a field like “behavioural economic policy”. 
Compared to financial markets, human instincts and psychologically rooted 
irrationalities should have a deeper impact in economic policy phenomena due to 
lacking market forces which punish irrationalities on an individual basis. Compared 
to an instinct driven voter, a voter who practices rational optimisation at the ballot 
box does not benefit from better politics. From an individual perspective, irrational 
voting is extremely cheap; the marginal costs are basically zero. This is different for 
private economic decision, e.g., in regard to investment, labour market and 
education decisions. Choosing an education without job and income chances, for 
example, is punished on an individual basis and thus demands a high individual 
price. Choosing a political programme at the ballot box which is doomed to 
economic failure is individually costless. 
In addition, Heinemann (2001) argues that a number of empirically proven 
psychological anomalies have a substantial explanatory potential in the context of 
reform resistance. Examples are phenomena such as the “status quo bias”, the 
“endowment effect” and “loss aversion”. The status quo bias describes a situation 
where people have a preference for one option among many others only because this 
option happens to be the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). If a change 
occurs this specific option loses attraction immediately. The endowment effect 
stands for preferences that depend on whether a certain good is possessed or not: 
Experiments show that the willingness to pay for acquiring good x is significantly 
smaller than the price the same person would accept for giving up good x 
(Kahneman et al., 1991). Loss aversion, finally, denotes the fact that the absolute 
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change in utility associated with a loss is larger than the absolute change in utility 
associated with a gain (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1991). With loss aversion the 
utility function is non-continuous in the reference point which tends to be the status 
quo. All these anomalies work against reforms that change the status quo. 
Sometimes these anomalies also underline arguments familiar from rational 
explanations: Loss aversion, for example, might explain why the reform resistance 
of reform losers is more intense than the reform support from reform winners.  
Empirically it is hard to disentangle rational ignorance from rational irrationality 
since both phenomena are deeply interrelated within the human mind. However, 
both concepts hint to the same proxies that can be included in empirical studies, for 
example variables on the state of a population’s education. 
This short overview demonstrates that there is a whole universe of factors which 
might be potentially relevant for the explanation of reform speed. There is no single 
empirical approach which would be able to cover all these dimensions. Hence, in the 
following we apply a less ambitious approach. We look for empirical evidence for 
the relevance of three classes of factors:  
? First, factors which represent the objective need of reforms and thus 
correspond to rational explanations in the sense that increasing costs of 
institutional stickiness should help overcome reform resistance. 
? Second, political-economic factors which explain the relative power of 
reform-resisting groups and thus correspond to rational explanations linked to 
distributional consequences of reforms. 
? Third, factors which correspond to rational ignorance and/or limited 
rationality – both classes of explanations can hardly be disentangled on the 
basis of the macro-approach applied here.  
3 Variables and descriptive analysis 
Any attempt to study the economics of reform processes by statistical and 
econometric tools faces a serious data problem. Adjusting an economy’s structure to 
new requirements is a complex process whose quantification is no straightforward 
task. The problems are manifold: It must be decided which kind of institutional 
change is a relevant and appropriate change and which not. Furthermore, changes 
must be translated into numbers that offer a starting point for the empirical 
assessment. Finally, the quantification should be available for different countries and 
different time periods in order to make inter-country comparisons and analyses 
along the time axis.  
In coping with these problems this study bases its quantification of reform processes 
on the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index developed by the Fraser 
Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2003a,b). The content of the index has developed 
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over time. It is available since 1970 in intervals of five years and covers 123 
countries. In its current version it contains 38 variables among which 18 variables 
are obtained from survey data while the others are based on objectively quantifiable 
data.1 The variables are grouped into the following five major areas for which 
individual sub-indices are calculated: size of government, legal system and property 
rights, sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners and regulation of credit, 
labour and business. After experimenting with different weighting approaches, in its 
recent version Gwartney and Lawson (2003b) calculate the aggregate index simply 
as unweighted mean of its five sub-components. For each variable economic 
freedom is measured on a scale of 0 to 10 where 0/10 means that a country is 
completely unfree/free 
Although necessarily there are many debatable issues in the context of such an 
ambitious indicator, the EFW indicator offers a good starting point for a 
quantification of economic reform processes. Its availability for a large country 
sample since 1970 makes it preferable to the Heritage Foundation’s index of 
economic freedom (O’Driscoll et al., 2003) which only covers the years since 1995. 
The availability of sub-indices is of particular interest in the context of economic 
reform obstacles. It allows testing for the impact of potential obstacles on different 
fields of economic reforms. A further big advantage is the fact that a wide literature 
has established at least a correlation if not a causal relationship between the indicator 
and economic growth (for a survey, see de Haan, 2003). Measuring reform processes 
on this basis therefore implies the measurement of structural changes conducive for 
growth. 
For the analysis a reform event is defined as a “significant” change in the EFW 
index within a five year interval where “significant” stands for an increase of 0.5, 
0.75 or 1 index point. The focus on the binary variable (reform yes or no) 
corresponds to the nature of reform blockades in which a sweeping reform 
breakthrough is needed associated with a wide and significant adjustment of out-
dated structures. 
Figure 1 and Tables 1-2 describe some characteristics of the reform history since the 
seventies: Reform activities started to accelerate in the eighties and reached a peak 
in the 1990-1995 period. This peak period was also characterised by particularly 
ambitious projects with a large share of “big” reforms (increase in EFW indicator by 
at least one point) in total reform events. Over time a marked shift in reform 
priorities has occurred: During the 70s and 80s the reform focus was on freedom of 
exchange, legal system/property rights and stable money. The size of government 
has become a major reform issue only since the second half of the eighties. 
Regulation has been addressed even later starting with the peak reform period 
1990/95. Reform history differs among income groups: Low income countries 
                                           
1 Survey data come from the International Country Risk Guide and the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report. 
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experienced a delay in following the global reform trend with rising numbers of 
reform events only since 1990/95. Reform frequency in high income countries 
peaked relatively early in 1985/90. 
 
 
Figure 1: Frequency of reform events (in % of period observations) 
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A reform event is defined as a change in the EFW aggregate indicator by at least 0.5/0.75/1.0 
points. 
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Table 1: Frequency of reform events (EFW sub-indicators): in % of period observations 
(total number of period observations) 
period  
70/75 75/80 80/85 85/90 90/95 95/00 all 
period
s 
government 15.6 13.1 23.4 46.5 42.1 33.6 29.7 
 (96) (107) (111) (114) (114) (122) (664) 
legal system 10.0 70.0 27.8 27.3 47.7 22.0 32.8 
 (50) (50) (90) (110) (111) (123) (534) 
Money 11.2 30.4 46.4 27.6 38.0 55.3 35.3 
 (107) (112) (112) (116) (121) (123) (691) 
Exchange 39.7 21.3 22.5 28.6 50.0 29.9 31.8 
 (73) (94) (102) (105) (106) (117) (597) 
Regulation 15.6 9.6 9.8 10.4 41.5 26.8 20.6 
change of  
 
at least 0.5 
 
 in sub- 
 
index 
 (45) (73) (102) (106) (118) (123) (567) 
  
 
 Table 2: Frequency of reform events for country income groups (EFW indicator): in % of 
period observations (total number of period observations) 
period  
70/75 75/80 80/85 85/90 90/95 95/00 all 
period
s 
high income 0.0 17.9 20.0 60.0 30.0 19.4 25.1 
countries (26) (28) (30) (30) (30) (31) (175) 
upper middle 0.0 38.5 20.0 36.4 54.5 42.3 35.7 
income 
countries 
(9) (13) (20) (22) (22) (26) (112) 
lower middle  18.2 6.7 20.8 40.7 72.4 42.4 38.8 
income 
countries 
(11) (15) (24) (27) (29) (33) (139) 
low income 14.3 14.3 17.9 13.3 34.4 51.5 27.8 
change of 
 
 at least 
 
 0.5 in 
 
 EFW 
 
 index 
countries (7) (14) (28) (30) (32) (33) (144) 
World Bank income classifications 
9 
As explained in our theoretical considerations in section 2 there are at least three 
classes of variables being potentially helpful for explaining the occurrence of 
reforms: first, variables representing the objective need for reforms; second, 
variables that are proxies for relevant political-economic factors; and third, variables 
that could be related to phenomena of rational ignorance and irrationality. The 
specific selection of variables in the following is influenced by data availability 
whereby extensive use has been made of the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicator (WDI) data base (see appendix for variable definitions and sources). The 
WDI data have the advantage to cover the time span and country sample of the 
Fraser Institute’s economic freedom indicator and thus can be integrated into the 
analysis. 
 
Proxies for need of reforms: 
Relevant variables to be included in this class are unemployment and growth – the 
latter defined as growth of total GDP or GDP per capita. In line with the hypothesis 
that a crisis is helpful to overcome reform blockades, changes in growth and 
unemployment rates should be more relevant than levels. 
Variables describing a country’s openness like export ratios and the extent of capital 
flows should also play a role since they indicate the intensity of present external 
competitive pressure. The same holds for the change of the real effective exchange 
rate which signals the development of external competitiveness. Sometimes the size 
of a country in terms of its population is also interpreted as a proxy for external 
competition in the sense that a small country should suffer from losing 
competitiveness faster than a big country. 
Moreover, a natural proxy for the economic need of reforms is the starting value of 
the economic freedom indicator: The closer the distance to the maximum value of 10 
the lower the need for reform activities in the logic of this study’s approach.  
 
Proxies for political-economic reform resistance 
Variables in the WDI data set that may be used as political-economic proxies are 
mainly those related to the population’s age structure. As argued in section 2 an 
important element of rational reform resistance is related to the discounting of future 
reform benefits. This discounting is likely to increase with age. A variable such as 
population share above 65 should, therefore, be negatively linked with reform 
capability. Similarly, a negative link can be expected in regard to dependency ratios. 
A positive link should exist between reform capability and life expectation: The 
longer the individual time horizon the more attractive are reforms associated with J-
curve effects.  
Other variables that would be useful, such as indicators of inequality, are not 
available for a reasonable number of observations.  
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Proxies for rational ignorance and/or limited rationality 
Reform resistance associated with rational ignorance or innate irrationalities should 
be a negative function of the population’s level of economic education. People 
knowledgeable about the economic system should also be more competent judges 
over appropriate reforms at the ballot box. Even though they have no direct 
incentive to get informed or to judge in a rational way a high level of economic 
education should – as a by-product – lead to better informed and more rational 
voting decisions. Unfortunately, there is no internationally consistent data set on 
economic education. Therefore, variables describing the general state of education 
such as school enrolment ratios have to be used. It is also experimented with WDI 
data quantifying the availability of media information (newspapers, televisions) – 
although it is not clear whether these very general media indicators are really a good 
indicator for a country’s quality of media information. A more direct proxy for the 
population’s economic education are variables quantifying the development of the 
financial sector such as credit aggregates – the presumption here is that a country’s 
financial development and the population’s economic knowledge is correlated. 
Table 3 presents the relevant variables’ means separately for reform and no-reform 
countries together with the results of the t-test for a difference in means. The 
variables are measured prior to the reform/no-reform period (for details of 
calculation, see appendix) in order to avoid an impact of reversed causality (e.g. 
from reform activity to growth). 
Reform countries, initially to reform period, have the following significant (at least 
10% significance for t-test) differences compared to no-reform countries: lower 
economic freedom, lower growth, and smaller increase in p.c. income (PPS) in 
preceding years. 
Many other differences – though not statistically significant – show expected signs. 
Reform countries, compared to no-reform countries are characterised by a larger 
growth reduction, a smaller p.c. income (PPS), a higher unemployment rate, a larger 
increase in unemployment rate, a larger real appreciation of the exchange rate, 
smaller dependency ratios, a longer life expectation, a smaller share of population 
below 65 and higher school enrolment ratios (tertiary schooling). 
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Table 3: Test for differences in mean for reform/no reform events (number of observations 
in brackets) 
 reform (EFW increase of at least 0.5)  
 means prior to 
reform period 
means prior to no- 
reform period  
significance t-test 
proxies reform needs 
Start value EFW 
indicator 
4.98 (178) 5.66 (392) 0.000 
growth rate 2.82 (176) 3.87 (376) 0.000 
change in growth rate -0.92 (171) -0.53 (366) 0.292 
GDP p.c. (PPS) 5703.35 (171) 6359.91 (328) 0.227 
change in GDP p.c. 
(PPS) 
1.26 (153) 1.35 (270) 0.001 
unemployment rate 8.73 (94) 7.65 (135) 0.173 
change in unemployment 
rate 
1.39 (63) 0.64 (91) 0.209 
change in real effective 
exchange rate 
0.99 (80) 0.95 (142) 0.448 
private capital flows in 
% GDP 
11.37 (158) 16.02 (294) 0.130 
exports/GDP 31.95 (176) 34.12 (372) 0.319 
Size of population 41.51 (177) 37.95 (387) 0.748 
proxies demographics related reform resistance 
dependency ratio 0.71 (177) 0.74 (387) 0.150 
life expectation 65.24 (177) 63.85 (387) 0.131 
population share >=65  6.32 (177) 6.60 (387) 0.466 
proxies rational ignorance / limited rationality 
Daily newspapers per 
1,000 people 
122.44 (170) 135.91 (377) 0.329 
TV-sets per 1,000 people 171.89 (174) 183.33 (367) 0.464 
School enrolment ration 
(tertiary education) 
16.00 (168) 15.13 (369) 0.501 
Domestic bank credit in 
% GDP 
52.35 (172) 54.86 (374) 0.488 
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Variables with a “wrong” and insignificant sign are: capital flows, export ratios, 
number of newspapers and televisions and bank credit to the private sector. 
Population size is not significantly different between reform and no-reform 
countries. 
Overall, the proxies for the need of reforms (in particular, the growth variables) 
perform best in this simple testing. Important proxies for political-economic reform 
resistance (like age structure and dependency ratio) and for limited 
rationality/information (school enrolment) show the correct sign but lack 
significance. However, this kind of descriptive exercise must now be substantiated 
by a more refined multivariate analysis.  
4 Econometric analysis 
The next step of the analysis is to explain the occurrence of reform event in the 
framework of a probit model. The binary 1/0 variable reform/no-reform is now 
modelled to be jointly determined by a whole range of explanatory variables which – 
according to our theory – could have an impact on the probability of reform. In order 
to avoid difficulties with reversed causation, explanatory variables are measured 
prior to the five-year-window which is the basis for the observation of a reform 
event. Generally, the estimations include time and income group dummies in order 
to control for significant differences in reform behaviour across income groups and 
periods. 
Compared to section 3, data availability leads to exclusion of a number of variables 
from the regressions: unemployment ratio, GDP p.c. and real exchange rates. 
Furthermore, a number of variables turned out to be insignificant and have, 
therefore, been excluded from the presented regressions: dependency ratio, relative 
number of newspapers and TV-sets, size of population, bank credit to the private 
sector.  
Nevertheless, proxies of each of the groups “reform needs”, “rational resistance” and 
“limited information/rationality” survive and contribute to the explanation at least of 
certain aspects in the determination of reforms.  
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Table 4: Probit regression: reform determinants, EFW total indicator 
 dependent variable: reform event yes (1) /no (0) 
periods: 70/75 – 95/00  
definition of reform event: increase in EFW indicator of at least: 
independent 
variables 
0.5 0.75 1 
constant 1.306 (0.24) 0.765 (0.55) 3.256*** (0.03) 
dummy 75/80 0.251 (0.49) 0.383 (0.49) -0.078 (0.90) 
dummy 80/85 0.427 (0.22) 0.606 (0.26) 0.198 (0.73) 
dummy 95/90 1.116*** (0.00) 0.931* (0.08) 0.474 (0.40) 
dummy 90/95 1.553*** (0.00) 1.667*** (0.00) 1.429** (0.01) 
dummy 95/00 1.585*** (0.00) 1.794*** (0.00) 1.309** (0.02) 
dummy upper 
middle income 
-0.572** (0.03) -0.276 (0.34) -0.539 (0.12) 
dummy lower 
middle income 
-0.852*** (0.00) -0.737** (0.03) -1.167*** (0.00) 
dummy low income -1.264*** (0.00) -1.092** (0.03) -2.052*** (0.00) 
Start value EFW -0.661*** (0.00) -0.630*** (0.00) -0.769*** (0.00) 
growth -0.015 (0.49) -0.065** (0.01) -0.080*** (0.01) 
export-GDP-ratio 0.001 (0.73 0.001 (0.72) 0.008* (0.06) 
life expectation 0.027* (0.08) 0.025 (0.15) -0.002 (0.90) 
population share 
>65 
-0.053* (0.05) -0.053* (0.09) -0.039 (0.28) 
school enrolment  -0.001 (0.84) -0.008 (0.37) -0.006 (0.59) 
obs. 519 519 519 
reform obs. 166 98 57 
R2 (Mc Fadden) 0.21 0.25 0.30 
p values in parentheses, */**/***: significant at 10%/5%/1%. 
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With regard to the overall reform activity (reform event defined as significant 
change of aggregate EFW indicator, Table 4) the following results emerge: A 
number of period and income group dummies are highly significant. Period 
dummies hint to a particularly reform friendly mood since 1990/95. Ceteris paribus, 
high income countries are significantly more reform friendly than lower middle and 
low income countries. Economic growth rates and the start value of economic 
freedom have a significant impact and support the view that economic necessity is a 
relevant driving force for reforms. Economic openness measured by the export ratio 
has the correct sign in the sense that larger openness increases the pressure for 
reform but reaches 10 percent significance only in the regression for substantial 
reform events (change of EFW indicator of at least 1 point). Age structure as proxy 
for rational reform-resistance of population groups with heavy discounting turns out 
to be weakly significant. The same holds for life expectation, although only in one 
specification. In contrast to that, school enrolment as a proxy for limited rationality 
is insignificant in all three specifications. Thus, the regressions for overall reform 
indicators do not hint to the relevance of limited rationality.  
This picture changes considerably when different reform fields are analysed 
separately on the basis of the five EFW sub-indicators (Table 5). First of all, income 
group dummies lose significance – income levels do not seem to affect reform 
probabilities when the approach differentiates between reform fields. Time 
dummies, however, remain significant and repeat the message of Table 1 that the 
focus of reforms shifts over time: There appears to be changing “fashions” of reform 
independently from the objective economic environment – for example the fact that 
cutting back government became a trend since 1985/90 or that 1990/1995 were the 
heydays of deregulation.  
Proxies for reform needs lose significance in these differentiated regressions: While 
the start value of the EFW indicator continues to be highly significant, the growth 
rate keeps its expected sign but is now insignificant for each sub-indicator. Export 
openness is significant with the correct sign in the context of reforms targeted at 
freedom of exchange which is a plausible result: The larger the shares of exports in 
GDP the more costly are restrictions to international transactions. Less plausible is 
the export ratio’s significance in regard to stable money with a negative sign.  
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Table 5: Probit regression: reform determinants, EFW sub-indicators 
 dependent variable: reform event yes (1) /no (0) 
periods: 70/75 – 95/00  
definition of reform event: 
increase in EFW sub-indicator of at least 0.5: 
Independent 
variables 
government legal 
structure 
exchange money regulation 
constant -0.449 (0.67) -0.940 (0.41) 1.851* (0.08) 1.472 (0.17) 0.227 (0.86) 
dummy 75/80 -0.323 (0.38) 1.692*** 
(0.00) 
0.373 (0.21) -0.581** 
(0.04) 
-0.060 (0.88) 
dummy 80/85 0.373 (0.24) 0.656** (0.04) 0.860*** 
(0.00) 
-0.714*** 
(0.01) 
-0.139 (0.71) 
dummy 85/90 0.940*** 
(0.00) 
0.598* (0.07) 0.503* (0.08) -0.546** 
(0.05) 
-0.304 (0.44) 
dummy 90/95 0.830*** 
(0.01) 
1.277*** 
(0.00) 
0.774*** 
(0.01) 
0.309 (0.26) 0.982*** 
(0.01) 
dummy 95/00 0.668** (0.05) 0.589* (0.09) 1.376*** 
(0.00) 
-0.129 (0.66) 0.634* (0.09) 
dummy upper 
middle inc. 
0.057 (0.83) -0.538** 
(0.05) 
-0.032 (0.90) -0.139 (0.61) -0.106 (0.71) 
dummy lower 
middle inc. 
0.127 (0.67) -0.322 (0.29) -0.123 (0.66) -0.302 (0.32) -0.050 (0.88) 
dummy low 
income 
0.342 (0.43) -0.397 (0.39) -0.512 (0.23) -0.184 (0.68) -0.523 (0.31) 
start value EFW -0.267*** 
(0.00) 
-0.245*** 
(0.00) 
-0.296*** 
(0.00) 
-0.324*** 
(0.00) 
-0.302*** 
(0.00) 
growth -0.019 (0.37) 0.008 (0.72) -0.010 (0.64) -0.007 (0.74) -0.014 (0.59) 
export-GDP-ratio 0.004 (0.17) 0.003 (0.33) 0.006** (0.05) -0.009** 
(0.02) 
0.005 (0.17) 
life expectation 0.009 (0.55) 0.017 (0.27) -0.019 (0.18) 0.013 (0.35) -0.003 (0.87) 
population share 
>65 
-0.038 (0.15) -0.015 (0.59) -0.006 (0.83) -0.053* (0.07) 0.040 (0.19) 
school enrolment  0.018*** 
(0.00) 
0.005 (0.48) -0.001 (0.91) 0.000 (0.95) 0.010 (0.16) 
obs. 515 481 519 500 491 
reform obs. 159 155 207 163 99 
R2 (Mc Fadden) 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.16 
p values in parentheses, */**/***: significant at 10%/5%/1%. 
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Similar to the reform need proxies the variables representing rational reform 
resistance perform worse in these differentiated regressions: life expectation and age 
structure are always insignificant with one exception in the stable money regression. 
The contrary holds for the proxy for the extent of rational ignorance and limited 
irrationality: School enrolment is now strongly significant with the expected sign in 
the reform regression for the size of government: Countries with better educated 
citizens are more likely to reform the government sector and to cut back government 
spending and taxes. 
5 Conclusions 
There is no one-dimensional answer why countries have different inclinations to 
delay or even refuse growth inducing reforms. Traditional answers given in the 
economic literature are related to the extent of economic crisis or to political-
economic factors. Our theoretical considerations suggest that these traditional 
answers are possibly incomplete. Limited rationality on the side of voters might be a 
further factor in the explanation of reform deadlocks: Blockades might occur 
because it is individually costless not to judge reforms in a completely rational way. 
Our empirical approach is not guided by the ambition to explore the full universe of 
rational and irrational determinants of reforms. However, we try to shed light on the 
weight of three classes of factors: those related to the objective need for reforms, 
those representing political-economic reform-resisting forces and those associated 
with rational ignorance or limited rationality. 
Not surprisingly, there is strong evidence that the objective need for reforms is 
highly relevant: The worse a country’s initial institutional setting the more likely are 
reforms. Equally, a poor growth performance has a positive impact on a country’s 
ability to overcome reform resistance. 
Among political-economic proxies the age structure has a certain explanatory power 
at least in the regressions based on the EFW total indicator. Here, reform 
probabilities decrease with the age of a population. This is a worrying result given 
the demographic future of industrial countries and the resulting needs for reforming 
the social systems.  
Data availability does not allow to test for the relevance of limited information and 
limited rationality in an extensive way. School enrolment as the related proxy is 
significant only in the government reform regression. This means a higher level of 
education makes it easier to reform the government sector. This is a plausible result: 
E.g. cutting back government subsidies is associated with immediate and highly 
visible losses whereas the benefits (future tax cuts, growth) are more abstract. A 
higher level of education may make it easier to welcome this kind of institutional 
change. 
17 
Apart from these results, other interesting insights emerge as a by-product: The 
significant period dummies are evidence for changing fashions in the focus of 
reforms. Deregulation, for example, only became a trend in the first half of the 
nineties.  
Obviously, this empirical approach is just a first step and much more needs to be 
done to really understand the economics of reforms. Apart from macro-approaches 
as applied in this paper micro-approaches e.g. on the basis of experimental research 
seem to be necessary. Differencing for example between by poor information and 
limited rationality as causes for the rejection of beneficial reforms is hardly possible 
on the basis of macro data. In this sense a frequent final conclusion applies particular 
well to this paper: More research is needed on the empirics of reforms. 
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Appendix: List of variables 
variable Calculation source 
growth average annual real GDP growth in five-year-
period prior to five-year-window 
WDI 
change growth difference average growth between two five-
year-periods prior to five-year-window 
WDI 
GDP p.c. (PPS) GDP p.c. in PPS (current international $), in 
the first year of five-year-window 
WDI 
change in GDP p.c. (PPS) change in GDP p.c. (PPS) during five-year-
period prior to five-year-window 
WDI 
unemployment rate unemployment rate at first year of five-year-
window 
WDI 
change unemployment rate five year change in unemployment rate prior 
to five-year-window  
WDI 
export-GDP-ratio exports in % GDP, in the first year of five-
year-window 
WDI 
capital flows private capital flows (in- and outwards) in % 
GDP, first year of five-year-window 
WDI 
change real effective 
exchange rate 
change real effective exchange rate within 
five-year-period prior to five-year-window 
(decline stands for depreciation) 
WDI 
population total population at first year of five-year-
window 
WDI 
population share >= 65 population 65 and above in % of total 
population at first year of five-year-window  
WDI 
dependency ratio age dependency ratio (dependents to working 
age population) at first year of five-year-
window 
WDI 
life expectation life expectation at birth at first year of five-
year-window 
WDI 
credit domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector, in % GDP, first year of five-year-
windwo 
WDI 
school enrolment school enrolment, tertiary (% of age group), 
in the first year of 5-year-window 
WDI 
daily newspapers per 1,000 
people 
first year of five-year-window WDI 
TV sets per 1,000 people first year of five-year-window WDI 
WDI: World Bank World Development IndicatorsEinführung. 
